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chapter eleven
The Embodiment of Virtue
Toward a Cross- Cultural Cognitive Science
Jake H. Davis
1. Introduction
The well- known Stanford Prison Experiment has recently become 
even more famous as a result of its Hollywood dramatization and its 
connections to incidents at the forefront of contemporary discussion 
in the United States, such as Abu Ghraib. Randomly assigned to roles 
as guards and prisoners, volunteers in the Prison Experiment quickly 
took on these social and emotional roles, and some guards became 
inventively sadistic.1 Though this work by Zimbardo and colleagues 
has sometimes been taken to show that people with an ostensibly 
good character will act in evil ways depending on arbitrary external 
conditions, this is not quite what the evidence shows; even under the 
 1 Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and Philip Zimbardo, “Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison,” 
International Journal of Criminology and Penology, no. 1 (1973): 69– 97.
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experimental conditions, not all of the guards took on an active role 
in perpetrating abuse. However, supported by the authority of the 
experimenters as well as the solidarity with their assigned group, what 
all of the other guards did do was to stand by as others committed 
dehumanizing abuse.
To begin our examination of the relation between embodiment and 
virtue, then, imagine how it would be for you to find yourself stand-
ing in the shoes of one of the “good” guards. One might stand by as 
members of one’s group treat others inhumanely, as the subjects in 
the Prison Experiment did. Alternatively, certain individuals in cer-
tain conditions might stand up against perceived wrongdoing. What 
is important to notice here is the emotional conflict one would feel, 
whichever direction one ultimately chose. On the one hand, there is 
the empathic motivation to relieve the suffering of the victims. Yet 
there is equally the pull of emotional solidarity with one’s group as well 
as— in real life cases— the motivation to protect not just oneself, but 
perhaps also family and friends, from the social, financial, and physical 
consequences speaking out.
Although the course of action one ultimately chooses in such a situ-
ation is of course of great import, the experimental evidence suggests 
that individuals imagining ahead of time how they would conduct 
themselves are often mistaken. So consider what your bodily behavior 
and experience might be in the moments before you ultimately chose 
to speak out or remain silent. How would the emotional conflict feel 
in your body? How would you direct your outward gaze, and how 
would you direct your mental attention? What action would feel most 
natural? Which actions would you find yourself inhibiting, holding 
yourself back from? Would you find yourself holding your tongue in 
order not to speak out, or resisting the impulse to respond forcefully to 
rebellious prisoners?
In this chapter, I will survey some specific ways in which virtue can 
be, and can fail to be, embodied by human beings. Much of the discus-
sion of ethics in modern Western philosophy has focused on applying 
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abstract principles of right and wrong to outward actions. Even within 
such approaches to ethics, there are some obvious ways in which vir-
tue and vice depend on embodiment. In physically abusing prisoners, 
guards use their bodies. And which types of actions will inflict suffer-
ing depend crucially on features of the prisoners’ human bodies; the 
fact that turning on lights every few hours will cause sleep deprivation 
or that prolonged confinement in a dark space will cause psychological 
suffering both depend on features of human neurophysiological sys-
tems. We share many of the same conditions for pleasure and pain with 
other mammals, and a more minimal set of conditions perhaps even 
more broadly. So if we assume that the pain and pleasure caused to oth-
ers is relevant to how we should act, then which traits count as virtuous 
depends at least in this minimal way on features of our embodiment, 
on what kinds of bodies we inhabit.
Adopting a cross- cultural and empirically based approach to eth-
ics opens up a range of less obvious and perhaps philosophically more 
interesting ways in which virtue depends on, and can be supported by, 
our human embodiment. In this chapter, I survey three areas in par-
ticular. In section 2, I focus on the training of virtuous habits of body 
and brain, through habituation. Here inspiration from early Chinese 
philosophical sources is of particular importance in moving forward 
some contemporary debates over the stability of ethical virtue. In sec-
tion 3, I focus more specifically on habits of internal attention to emo-
tional motivations. This leads us to a discussion, in section 4, of ethical 
conflict as embodied in emotional conflict.
2. Situating and Training Virtuous Habits
One response to the perceived overemphasis in modern philosophi-
cal ethics on application of abstract principles to ethical decision 
making was to shift toward earlier Greek approaches, particularly 
virtue- theoretic models inspired by Aristotle. We can give a general 
characterization of such an approach as focusing on the question 
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“What kind of person should I be?” as the central question of ethics, 
rather than the question “How should I act?”2 One should not be the 
kind of person who would turn sadistic in the role of prison guard, 
for instance, or even the kind of person who would stand by while 
others do. In emphasizing being a certain kind of person, with certain 
virtuous habits and tendencies, this approach to ethics is dependent 
on human embodiment in a different way. In particular, it requires 
a certain stability in the behavioral dispositions of an individual 
organism over time and across different environmental contexts. Yet 
more recent theorists including Gil Harman and John Doris have 
charged that simulations such as the Stanford Prison Experiment, 
as well as a number of more controlled demonstrations by Milgram 
and others,3 show that the behavioral tendencies of human beings are 
not of the right kind to make virtue ethics empirically plausible. The 
empirical evidence seems to show that in many cases the correlation 
across situations may be, in general, no better than .30. That is, put-
ting an individual brain- body system in different social and environ-
mental contexts elicits very different behavioral tendencies. Simply 
put, human behavioral dispositions are narrow and unreliable, not 
global and stable.4
Edward Slingerland argues that these low correlations are actu-
ally strong relative to other psychological results and also perfectly 
 2 If incomplete; see, for example, Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999).
 3 See, for example, Alice M. Isen and Paula F. Levin, “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies 
and Kindness,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21, no. 3 (1972): 384; John M. Darley and 
C. Daniel Batson, “‘ From Jerusalem to Jericho’: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in 
Helping Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27, no. 1 (1973): 100; Stanley Milgram, 
Obedience to Authority (Harper & Row, 1974).
 4 See, for example, Owen J. Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); John M. Doris, “Persons, Situations, and Virtue 
Ethics,” Nous 32, no. 4 (1998):  504– 530; John M. Doris, Lack of Character:  Personality and Moral 
Behavior (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Gilbert Harman, “Moral Philosophy 
Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error,” in Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 99 (139): 315– 331.
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admissible for many of our practical concerns.5 For instance, in 
choosing a student to guard a donation box, we are justified in choos-
ing someone who has not cheated on tests in the past over someone 
who has, even if past tendencies are not perfectly reliable predictors 
of future actions. Similarly, we might well recommend to our friends 
a mechanic who performs his services in a trustworthy fashion, even 
if he cheats on his taxes— that is, even thought the mechanic’s trust-
worthiness is less than completely global. In many cases we can settle 
for virtues that are less than perfectly reliable and less than com-
pletely global.
Nonetheless, being faithful to one’s spouse one third of the time 
will hardly qualify as a virtue. For certain virtues we expect, at least in 
moral exemplars, 100% reliability. At least some moral exemplars in 
Chinese moral discourse do claim this kind of reliability. Slingerland 
notes, for one, “Confucius’s famous declaration that he could go and 
live among the Eastern barbarians and not only maintain his moral 
perfection but in fact transform his social environment through his 
moral influence (Analects 9.14).” Early Confucian philosophy pro-
poses to achieve something like this kind of stability through two 
complementary means.
For one, Confucian moral culture prescribes a fine- grained manipu-
lation of the social context. As Slingerland puts it “the early Chinese 
Confucians paid a great deal of attention to the power of the embod-
ied situation— social role, dress, ambient color, and sound— to effect 
human dispositions and behavior.”6 According to Slingerland, this 
focus strengthens the empirical plausibility of virtue ethics, or at least 
this early Confucian version of the approach. To be fair, the empirical 
literature cited by Harman and Doris is intended precisely to show the 
power of social situations; it is just this power of such social context in 
 5 Edward Slingerland, “The Situationist Critique and Early Confucian Virtue Ethics,” Ethics 121, no. 
2 ( January 2011): 390– 419.
 6 Ibid., 418.
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determining behavior that critics take to show a lack of stable, global 
ethical dispositions in individuals. Still, perhaps the point here is that 
this very emphasis on the individual as the focus of ethical theorizing 
is problematic, and a problem implicit in the situationist critique of 
virtue ethics as much as in the modern theoretical alternatives to vir-
tue ethics. Virtue ethics done properly is based on the idea that virtue 
can be embodied only in certain kinds of social situations as much as 
only in certain sorts of dispositions; the contention is that this is not a 
weakness but a strength of such an approach to answering the question 
of how we ought to be.
Perhaps more importantly for our purposes, manipulating the social 
environment can be seen, as in the Confucian context, as a means 
to enable the cultivation of stable dispositions towards certain types 
of behavior. These are ultimately intended to be dispositions stable 
enough to be maintained “even among the Eastern Barbarians,” as we 
have seen. They are presumably also intended to be stable enough to 
be maintained by individuals cast in the role of a prison guard, or a 
supreme ruler. Slingerland describes in detail the method of cultivation 
employed by the teacher Mencius with an oppressive king who displays 
a profound lack of the virtue of benevolence (ren) in his dealings with 
his subjects. Mencius notes a story of the king’s own display of com-
passion towards an ox being lead to ritual sacrifice— a narrow context. 
By means of creating emotional resonance between that narrow situ-
ation and the the broader set of situations in which the king relates to 
his human subjects, the teacher works towards a gradual strengthen-
ing and “extension” (tui) of the disposition toward benevolence in the 
king. In short, Mencius aims at fostering in the king benevolence as a 
global virtue.
The empirical literature cited by situationist critics of virtue ethics 
focuses on “untutored” dispositions, as Slingerland points out. Indeed, 
the interest of studies such as the Stanford Prison Experiment to crit-
ics such as Harman and Doris is that they challenge our own self- 
conception, by showing that untutored folks like us wrongly attribute 
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stable virtues to ourselves.7 This point is crucial. The viability of virtue 
ethics may yet be vindicated by new studies on the ability of human 
dispositions in general, and ethically relevant dispositions in particu-
lar, to become more stable and more global through training.
As Slingerland notes, the Confucian emphasis on ritual (li) involves 
training bodily habits of behaving in prescribed ways. This emphasis 
on training bodily habits helps to explain how some of these might 
achieve stability across contexts. Perhaps stable, reliable, ethically rel-
evant dispositions can be trained through the use of logical reason-
ing and emotional analogy alone. But, on the other hand, perhaps this 
stability can only be achieved through the training of bodily habits. 
Perhaps both are required, or perhaps neither is effective enough, even 
in conjunction with one another. Ultimately, this is an empirical ques-
tion, though one that is largely yet to be explored. There is some pre-
liminary evidence that academic training in ethical reasoning is not 
sufficient; ethics professors apparently do not in general display more 
consistency between their expressed attitudes and their behavior than 
others, nor do they show consistently better behavior in general, and 
their reasoning about ethical questions is affected by irrelevant factors 
such as the order of question presentation, just as it is for the rest of us.8 
In advance of other evidence, it seems likely that whereas ethical rea-
soning is fickle and subject to rationalization, bodily habits of perceiv-
ing suffering and reacting with kindness may be more ingrained and 
 7 There is a side issue here in that virtue ethics was revived in recent philosophy in part as an antidote 
to the perceived impracticality of utilitarianism and deontology, and to return to a more humanly 
practicable ideal. Still this selling point for virtue theories may yet be vindicated to the degree empiri-
cal work shows a viable method for training the mind and body so as to achieve more stable and more 
global ethical dispositions.
 8 Eric Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust, “The Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors:  Relationships 
among Self- Reported Behavior, Expressed Normative Attitude, and Directly Observed Behavior,” 
Philosophical Psychology 27, no. 3 (2014): 293– 327; Eric Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust, “The Moral 
Behaviour of Ethicists: Peer Opinion,” Mind 118, no. 472 (2009): 1043– 1059; Eric Schwitzgebel, “Do 
Ethicists Steal More Books?” Philosophical Psychology 22, no. 6 (2009): 711– 725; Eric Schwitzgebel 
and Fiery Cushman, “Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional 
Philosophers and Non- Philosophers,” Mind & Language 27, no. 2 (2012): 135– 153.
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less subject to situational factors. If so, this would be a further sense in 
which virtue depends on embodiment.
3. Embodying Attentiveness
In the previous section, we raised the question of whether training in 
certain external behavioral routines or, alternately, training in ethi-
cal reasoning would be more effective in cultivating the sort of stable 
global dispositions worthy of being called virtues. However, there is a 
third option: the training of attention. Perceptual habits of attending 
to certain aspects of the external environment and certain aspects of 
one’s internal states may in fact structure many responses to ethically 
charged situations. Indeed, attentional habits may help to determin-
ing both the trajectory of an individual’s ethical reasoning and also the 
trajectory of behavioral response.
In offering an empirically grounded analysis the situationist chal-
lenge to virtue ethics, Merrit, Doris, and Harman emphasize the 
importance of other- directed attention.9 In Milgram’s obedience 
studies, subjects were instructed by an authority figure in a lab coat to 
administer increasing levels of electric shock to a “learner,” a confed-
erate of the experimenters who acted out intense physical pain, pro-
tested, and finally collapsed. What is shocking about the results is the 
evidence of how far apparently normal individuals will go to follow 
the directions of an authority figure. Merritt and colleagues note, how-
ever, that variations of the Milgram experiment showed that when the 
authority figure was physically more distant, subjects’ tendency to con-
tinue to inflict shocks to the “victim” was drastically lower. This and 
related evidence they take to show the crucial role in which external 
situations can structure attention to the embodied presence of author-
ity figures and thus attention and deference to their suggestions. They 
 9 Maria Merritt, John Doris, and Gilbert Harman, “Character,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, 
ed. John M. Doris (Oxford University Press, 2010), 355– 401.
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thus echo the point relayed by Slingerland from the early Confucian 
tradition of the ethical importance of the external social situations we 
create and situate ourselves in.
A second relevant aspect of other- directed attention is attending 
toward victims. Merritt et  al. note that in the Milgram obedience 
studies subjects were “viscerally” affected by the victim’s cries and 
exhibited signs of affective and physiological arousal indicating stress. 
Interestingly, some subjects turn their heads “to avoid seeing the vic-
tim suffer,” mask the victim’s cries with their own vocalizations, or 
turn attention away from the victim and confine it to the mechan-
ics of the procedure.10 This human impulse to turn away is familiar 
to us, for instance from the good guards’ actions in dramatizations 
of the Stanford Prison Experiment, and— perhaps in less extreme 
circumstances— from our own lives. There are two points here of spe-
cial importance for our purposes. First, the virtue of care for others in 
such situations can be embodied in whether we turn our eyes away, or 
move away. Secondly, the disposition to turn away serves at least in part 
as a method emotional regulation, a means to decrease the stress of see-
ing another suffer. We return to this point in more detail in section 
4. For now, however, note that some measure of this kind of distrac-
tion from others’ suffering can be achieved through mental distraction, 
even when we do not physically turn away. Conversely, perhaps part 
of what is required in order to embody virtue is the disposition not to 
distract ourselves from the stress of seeing others suffer, not to become 
overwhelmed by it, but rather to feel our own emotional suffering in a 
full and balanced way.
Buddhist ethical texts claim that this kind of mindful awareness of 
the body, affective reactions, and other internal states facilitates wise 
judgment and virtuous behavior. They are not alone in emphasizing 
the connection between attention and virtue. William James asserted 
 10 Milgram, Obedience to Authority, 155, 161, quoted in Merritt, Doris, and Harman, “Character,” 
382– 383.
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that “the faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention, 
over and over again, is the very root of judgment, character, and will.”11 
More recently, a small number of theorists including Goldie and, sepa-
rately, Brady, have debated the role of “virtuous habits of attention” 
in facilitating the kinds of understanding required for moral develop-
ment and ethical behavior: understanding of what is dangerous, what 
is shameful, what is praiseworthy, and so on.12 Yet despite agreeing on 
the ethical importance of habits of attention, these Western theorists 
have not offered anything like the detailed practical guidance for, and 
philosophical analysis of, training programs aimed at developing virtu-
ous habits of attention that is offered in Buddhist traditions.
The recent upsurge in research on attention training programs 
derived from Buddhist traditions, particularly mindfulness medita-
tion, offers an opportunity to test the ethical relevance of training 
embodied awareness. Research has shown that mindfulness practice 
not only improves attention, perception, and metacognition,13 and 
is associated with decreased mind wandering,14 but also predicts 
introspective accuracy in bodily awareness,15 and is correlated with 
more accurate first- person reports about emotional response.16 These 
 11 William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Holt), 1890, Chapter 11.
 12 Peter Goldie, “Emotion, Reason, and Virtue,” in Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality, eds. Dylan 
Evans and Pierre Cruse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 249– 267; Michael S. Brady, “Virtue, 
Emotion, and Attention,” Metaphilosophy 41, no. 1– 2 (2010): 115– 131; Michael S. Brady, Emotional 
Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
 13 Antoine Lutz et  al., “Mental Training Enhances Attentional Stability:  Neural and Behavioral 
Evidence,” The Journal of Neuroscience 29, no. 42 (October 21, 2009): 13418– 13427; K. A. MacLean 
et al., “Intensive Meditation Training Improves Perceptual Discrimination and Sustained Attention,” 
Psychological Science 21, no. 6 (May 11, 2010):  829– 839; Benjamin Baird et  al., “Domain- Specific 
Enhancement of Metacognitive Ability Following Meditation Training,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General 143, no. 5 (2014): 1972.
 14 Judson A. Brewer et al., “Meditation Experience Is Associated with Differences in Default Mode 
Network Activity and Connectivity,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, no. 50 
(December 13, 2011): 2054– 2059.
 15 Kieran C. R. Fox et al., “Meditation Experience Predicts Introspective Accuracy,” PloS One 7, no. 
9 (2012): e45370.
 16 Jocelyn A. Sze et  al., “Coherence between Emotional Experience and Physiology:  Does Body 
Awareness Training Have an Impact?” Emotion 10, no. 6 (2010): 803– 814.
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abilities may derive in part from temporary increases in neural activity 
in somatosensory areas,17 as well as longer- term structural changes in 
the brain.18
If the psychological and neuroscientific exploration of how mind-
fulness practice works to train embodied awareness is still in its early 
years, testing of the Buddhist claims for a relation between mind-
fulness practice and ethical understanding is barely in its infancy. 
Condon and collaborators recently found that individuals training in 
either mindfulness practice or in compassion meditation were more 
likely than controls to help a bystander in need. Interestingly, there was 
no significant different between the two meditation types in helping 
behavior.19 Kirk and colleagues drew a closer tie to embodiment with 
a study showing associations between mindfulness training, neural 
activity consistent with increased interoceptive awareness, and more 
altruistic and less punishing responses in the Ultimatum Game.20 The 
Ultimatum Game is a simulation of economic behavior, in which one 
party, the proposer, is given the decision of how to split $10, say, with 
a second party, the responder, with the caveat that if the responder 
rejects the offer, neither gets any. Most equal offers are accepted. 
But as offers become increasingly less equal, they are more likely to 
 17 Catherine E. Kerr et  al., “Mindfulness Starts with the Body:  Somatosensory Attention and 
Top- down Modulation of Cortical Alpha Rhythms in Mindfulness Meditation,” Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience 7 (2013), http:// www.frontiersin.org/ Human_ Neuroscience/ 10.3389/ 
fnhum.2013.00012/ abstract; Catherine E. Kerr et al., “Effects of Mindfulness Meditation Training 
on Anticipatory Alpha Modulation in Primary Somatosensory Cortex,” Brain Research Bulletin 85, 
no. 3– 4 (May 2011): 96– 103.
 18 S. W. Lazar et  al., “Meditation Experience Is Associated with Increased Cortical Thickness,” 
Neuroreport 16, no. 17 (2005): 1893; B. K Hölzel et al., “Stress Reduction Correlates with Structural 
Changes in the Amygdala,” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 5, no. 1 (2010):  11– 17; B. K 
Hölzel et  al., “Mindfulness Practice Leads to Increases in Regional Brain Gray Matter Density,” 
Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging 191, no. 1 (2011): 36– 43.
 19 P. Condon et  al., “Meditation Increases Compassionate Responses to Suffering,” Psychological 
Science, August 21, 2013.
 20 Ulrich Kirk, J. Downar, and P.R. Montangue, “Interoception Drives Increased Rational Decision- 
Making in Meditators Playing the Ultimatum Game,” Frontiers in Decision Neuroscience 5 (2011): 49.
AQ: Missing 
in references.
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be rejected. Chapman et al. investigated the emotional basis of these 
decisions by asking participants in an Ultimatum Game to indicate 
how well their feelings about the preceding offer were represented by 
photographs of faces displaying disgust, anger, contempt, fear, sad-
ness, surprise, or happiness.21 Not surprisingly, ratings of happiness 
dropped rapidly from a high when offers were equal (5:5) as the offers 
became less equal, with the proposer offering to keep $7 and give the 
responder $3, or to keep $9 and give the proposer $1. In contrast, rat-
ings of disgust and anger increased dramatically as the offers became 
more unequal. Moreover, the researchers found that changes in facial 
muscles associated with disgust were correlated with subjective identi-
fication with disgust faces. This suggests that emotions such as anger 
and disgust drive the behavioral response of rejecting unfair offers in 
economic games.
Kirk et  al.’s investigation suggests that individuals with increased 
interoceptive awareness were more willing to accept unfair offers, and 
thus that their actions were not driven to the same extent as controls by 
sentiments of anger and disgust. The authors characterize their results 
as showing that mindfulness serves to cultivate “rational” responses 
to economic exchanges in the Ultimatum Game. However, a note of 
caution is necessary. On the individual level, the costs of retributive 
response may indeed outweigh the benefits, both in these laboratory- 
based economic games and also in daily human interactions. 
Nonetheless, the enforcement of fairness norms serves an important 
communal function. And more generally, sentiments such as outrage or 
guilt driving outcome- based moral judgment may be adaptive in terms 
of reproductive fitness.22 In his classic paper on the emergence of altru-
istic behavior, Trivers notes that moralistic aggression and indignation 
 21 H. A. Chapman et al., “In Bad Taste: Evidence for the Oral Origins of Moral Disgust,” Science 323, 
no. 5918 (2009): 1222– 1226.
 22 Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter, “Altruistic Punishment in Humans,” Nature 415, no. 6868 ( January 
10, 2002): 137– 140.
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might have been selected for as a means to counteract the tendency of 
the emotional rewards of altruism to drive continual altruistic acts in 
the absence of reciprocity.23 This gives rise to a possible explanation of 
Kirk et al.’s result:  if feeling altruistic is emotionally more rewarding 
than feeling anger or disgust, individuals who are for whatever reason 
more fully and accurately aware of which emotional motivations are 
intrinsically punishing and which are not might be less motivated to 
engage in retributive emotional reactions and more motivated to culti-
vate altruistic ones. We turn to this further aspect of the embodiment 
of virtue, in the emotional reward of certain motivations over others, 
in the next section.
4. Ethical Conflict in the Body
There is considerable controversy about the about the role of embodied 
emotion in ethical concepts and ethical judgment,24 and about the role 
of emotion in ethical motivation.25 Nonetheless, as Hollywood drama-
tizations and first- person reflection help to illustrate, to face an ethical 
dilemma is often to face an emotional conflict, one that is expressed 
bodily and that we can feel in our bodies. To take one extreme example, 
Jonathan Bennett reads Heinrich Himmler’s remarks in a 1943 speech 
as indicating that the principles the architect of the Final Solution held 
 23 Robert Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” The Quarterly Review of Biology 46, no. 1 
(1971): 49.
 24 Jesse Prinz and Shaun Nichols, “Moral Emotions,” The Moral Psychology Handbook, ed. John M. 
Doris, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 111– 147; Jesse J. Prinz, The Emotional Construction 
of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); B. Huebner, S. Dwyer, and M. Hauser, “The 
Role of Emotion in Moral Psychology,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13, no. 1 (2009):  1– 6; Bryce 
Huebner, “Do Emotions Play a Constitutive Role in Moral Cognition?” Topoi 34, no. 2 (2015): 427– 
440; J. Greene, “Emotion and Cognition in Moral Judgment:  Evidence from Neuroimaging,” in 
Neurobiology of Human Values, edited by J.P. Changeux, et al., 57– 66 (New York: Springer, 2005); 
Mark Johnson, Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding from the Perspective of Cognitive Science 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
 25 Timothy Schroeder, Adina Roskies, and Shaun Nichols, “Moral Motivation,” in The Moral 
Psychology Handbook, ed. John M. Doris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 72– 110.
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to be moral ones forced him to overcome emotional reactions of sym-
pathy that he did nonetheless feel for the living beings he was respon-
sible for exterminating. Himmler apparently suffered from nausea, 
stomach- convulsions, and various other complaints; Bennett quotes 
and endorses the characterization by Kersten, Himmler’s physician, of 
these ailments of Himmler’s as “the expression of a psychic division 
which extended over his whole life.”26
The motivation to avoid cognitive dissonance seems likely to be a 
widely shared aspect of animal psychology. Although Festinger’s the-
ory of cognitive dissonance as a core drive has been controversial, a 
recent review by Gawronski argues that this core drive imposes a uni-
versal constraint on belief systems across cultures and species.27 He 
notes, for instance, that the motivation to avoid cognitive dissonance 
seems to be present even in rats.28 These sorts of results, in contrast 
to some of the earlier research, seem to suggest a kind of dissonance 
that is not dependent on language, but is instead a more embodied and 
broadly shared animal motivation. In light of such evidence, we can 
see part of the motivation to act virtuously as a motivation to avoid 
conflict within ourselves, an emotional conflict that is as much physi-
ological as rational.
If the emotionally painful social consequences that encourage even 
“good” guards not to speak out are abundantly clear, it is less clear the 
nature of the forces on the opposite side of the emotional conflict. 
Aristotle emphasizes the role of emotion and of pain and pleasure 
in virtue (NE, Book II, Chapter  3). While agreeing with this broad 
emphasis, Buddhist traditions make a further claim that is interesting 
 26 Jonathan Bennett, “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,” Philosophy 49, no. 188 (1974): 129.
 27 Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1957); Bertram 
Gawronski, “Back to the Future of Dissonance Theory: Cognitive Consistency as a Core Motive,” 
Social Cognition 30, no. 6 (2012): 652– 668.
 28 Emma S. Lydall, Gary Gilmour, and Dominic M. Dwyer, “Rats Place Greater Value on Rewards 
Produced by High Effort:  An Animal Analogue of the ‘Effort Justification’ Effect,” Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 46, no. 6 (November 2010): 1134– 1137.
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in light of recent research: that ethically wholesome emotional moti-
vations actually feel good, while ethically unwholesome emotional 
motivations feel bad.29 To be at all plausible, this sort of claim has to 
be bolstered, as the Buddhist account is, by a proposal for how we can 
come to see more clearly which of our own emotional motivations are 
pleasurable and painful, and thus by a corresponding account of how 
we might (many of us, much of the time) be mistaken about this. The 
essential idea as that, when we train a more fully embodied awareness 
in the way sketched in the previous section, altruistic motivations are 
revealed as being more pleasurable than their opposites.
Altruistic behavior can be rewarding in various ways, and in many 
cases helping others may be merely an instrumental goal in service of 
getting social or other emotional rewards for oneself. In a series of 
classic studies, Batson and colleagues tested a range of such egoistic 
explanations of helping behavior against their own empathy- altruism 
hypothesis that egoistic concerns are not the only motivation for 
altruistic behavior. Put another way, Batson’s hypothesis is that some 
motivations for some altruistic acts do take as their ultimate goal 
the welfare of the other, rather than the motivation to help another 
always being proximate, in the sense of being merely a means to some 
other self- interested ultimate goal. The power of Batson’s work lies 
in the groundbreaking experimental paradigms he used to isolate 
and test cases in which the posited egoistic concerns could be satis-
fied without altruistic action to relieve another’s suffering. In some 
experiments, Batson and colleagues manipulated feelings of empa-
thy in subjects by using similarity manipulations, such as providing 
a filled- out questionnaire indicating that the suffering person’s val-
ues were similar or dissimilar to those indicated by the subject; in 
others they induced emotion- specific misattribution, by providing a 
placebo pill and information either that the pill had the side effect of 
 29 Maria Heim, The Forerunner of All Things:  Buddhaghosa on Mind, Intention, and Agency 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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inducing feelings of personal distress, or else that the that the pill had 
the side effect of inducing feelings of concern.30 These manipulations 
allow a test of the empathy- altruism hypothesis against the compet-
ing view that all helping behavior is motivated by egoistic concerns, 
such as the motivation to reduce the empathic distress brought on by 
seeing another suffering noted above in Milgram’s subjects. In high- 
empathy conditions in Batson’s experiements, individuals provided 
with an easy possibility for removing themselves from a situation 
in which they observed another suffering were less likely to choose 
to escape than in low- empathy conditions. This counts against the 
idea that altruistic helping is driven by a simple goal of reducing 
aversive arousal. With similar manipulations, Batson and colleagues 
provided powerful experimental evidence against a range of more 
sophisticated egoistic explanations of altruistic behavior, including 
social evaluation and self- criticism.31 Using a reaction time task, for 
instance, individuals in the high- empathy condition in one study 
showed no increases in cognitive association with concepts of social 
reward such as PROUD, HONOR, PRAISE, but did show a posi-
tive association with victim- related words. In another study, Batson 
and colleagues found positive changes in self- reported mood when 
the suffering of the other was ended, even when the possibility to 
help was taken away. One especially interesting study addressed a 
proposed egoistic motivation to gain vicarious or contagious good 
feelings when the suffering of another is relieved.32 Contradicting 
the conclusions of a previous study, Batson and colleagues again 
found support for the empathy- altruism hypothesis. Although there 
was some evidence for motivation to experience vicarious relief in 
 30 C. D. Batson et al., “Is Empathic Emotion a Source of Altruistic Motivation?” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 40, no. 2 (1981): 290.
 31 C. D. Batson and L. L. Shaw, “Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives,” 
Psychological Inquiry 2, no. 2 (1991): 107– 122.
 32 C. D. Batson et al., “Empathic Joy and the Empathy- Altruism Hypothesis,” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 61, no. 3 (1991): 413.
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the low- empathy conditions, individuals in the high- empathy con-
dition did not increase their helping behavior when expecting to 
receive feedback from the person helped, and did not increase their 
interest in hearing about the suffering person’s status dependent on 
the likelihood that the person’s condition would in fact improve.
Batson’s results, if correct, show that we cannot explain altruistic 
behavior in terms of expected future rewards, even internal ones. 
They explicitly rule out the hypothesis that subjects “learn through 
prior reinforcement that, after helping those for whom we feel empa-
thy, we can expect a special mood- enhancing pat on the back,” for 
instance.33 Nonetheless, it is consistent with Batson’s results, and 
perhaps also with the spirit of his proposal, to suggest that people 
are motivated to act altruistically because feeling altruistic feels 
good— that is, making another’s welfare one’s ultimate goal could 
be motivated by the hedonic reward of present altruistic emotional 
motivations themselves. It is important to note that emotional moti-
vations can be seen as distinct from the external stimulation they arise 
with. When one encounters others suffering, such an experience may 
be painful, as it seems to have been for some subjects in the Stanford 
Prison experiment and Milgram’s obedience studies. But the negative 
affective valence of such external stimuli can be met and held by an 
internal emotional motivation of friendliness. One way of reading 
the Buddhist claim is that this basic friendliness, just as it arises and 
before it can manifest in helping behavior, may itself be more plea-
surable than the alternative ways of reacting to suffering. When this 
sort of basic friendliness comes into contact with another’s success, 
on this account, it protects one against feeling envy, and manifests 
instead as what Buddhist translators have termed sympathetic joy. 
Equally, when this same internal quality of heart of basic friendliness 
and care comes in contact with suffering, it manifests as compassion, 
a desire to help.
 33 Batson and Shaw, “Evidence for Altruism,” 117, my emphasis.
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It is conceivable that individuals could be motivated to cultivate an 
altruistic state just because it feels better to feel that way toward oth-
ers than the relevant alternative emotional options. On one construal 
we could take this as just another sort of proximate motivation: one 
is only motivated to be motivated to help because that desire to help 
feels good. On the other hand, one could also take this as a claim about 
the nature of motivation: what it is to be motivated in a certain way is 
that it feels pleasurable to move oneself towards that goal. On this con-
strual, what makes it the case that helping another is one’s ultimate goal 
is just the fact that the physiological state that results in such actions is 
experienced as pleasurable. And if individuals are motivated to culti-
vate this basic friendliness because of its relative ease, simply by being 
more often in this emotional state rather than its opposites, they would 
more often be disposed to act for other’s welfare in cases of need.
This is of course an empirical claim that we are deriving from 
Buddhist tradition, and as such subject to empirical refutation. 
Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence from a few recent investigations 
provides initial support for the idea that there can be a pleasurable 
internal response to suffering, or at least helps to clarify the notion 
for further testing. In a recent pilot investigation of the neural basis of 
compassion, Tania Singer asked the Buddhist monk Matthieu Ricard 
to help differentiate compassion from empathic distress by direct-
ing his mind for one hour in the fMRI scanner just toward images 
of suffering, feeling the distress that brings on, without allowing this 
to move into the emotions of well- wishing that the Buddhist tradi-
tion suggests are so important to train. According to recent com-
ments by both Ricard and Singer, Ricard found this one hour nearly 
unbearable, and practically begged Singer to allow him to switch to 
his highly trained manner of responding to suffering with what he 
describes as “human warmth … love and compassion.”34 What this 
 34 Comments by Tania Singer at Mind and Life XXV, 2012.
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suggests is that it is possible to train a more fully embodied awareness 
that feels the relief of altruistic motivations, and thereby can help to 
strengthen the power of these forces over others in cases such as the 
“good” guards’ internal struggle. If proves right, it provides a yet a fur-
ther way in which virtue depends on embodiment.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter I  have brought together recent empirical research 
with Confucian and Buddhist philosophical proposals, in order to 
sketch specific avenues for further investigation of the embodiment 
of virtue. The aim of such a cross- cultural approach is to ensure that 
our explorations of embodiment and of virtue do not become— or 
remain— overly beholding to any one particular conceptual frame-
work for understanding the human mind and human life.35 On the 
topics of embodiment and of ethics this need is especially pressing— 
for the rationalism of modern Western philosophy and the cogni-
tivism of recent empirical investigations of the mind, for all their 
achievements, have equally left of us blind to important aspects of 
lived experience, and of ourselves. Buddhism and Confucianism 
have their own blindspots, of course, and this is why dialogue is so 
valuable to all parties. I have sketched three areas where integrating 
cross- cultural reflection with recent empirical research may prove 
particularly useful in pushing our investigation into virtue beyond 
its current confines: the training of ethical dispositions in social con-
texts; the training of attentional habits in relation to embodied emo-
tion; and finally the topic of conflict as well as resolution between 
embodied ethical motivations.
 35 Jonardon Ganeri, Attention and Consciousness: The Metaphysics of Autonomous Shadows., forth-
coming; J. Garfield, Engaging Buddhism:  Why It Matters to Philosophy. 1st ed (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2015); Jake H. Davis and Evan Thompson, “From the Five Aggregates to Phenomenal 
Consciousness: Towards a Cross- Cultural Cognitive Science,” in A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, 
ed. Steven M. Emmanuel ( John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 585– 597.
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